This post is a scenario, not a forecast. It sketches how world trade might look by 2032 if the move from globalization towards regionalization continues: more trade inside regions, less dependence between the US and China, and a larger role for India, ASEAN and Africa. It was written in August 2024, shortly after a Boston Consulting Group (BCG) analysis published in Fortune set out four possible scenarios for world trade over the next decade. Figures attributed to BCG come from that analysis and from Global Trade Review’s report of the same research. Everything else about 2032 is the author’s speculation, and developments after August 2024 are not reflected.
What the BCG analysis estimated
BCG described four scenarios, from renewed global cooperation (which it considered least likely) to regional conflicts, global escalation and a multipolar rivalry between competing blocs. Its trade estimates to 2032 include a fall of about US$197 billion in US-China trade compared with 2022, and growth of about US$466 billion in US trade with Canada and Mexico over the decade. BCG research reported by Global Trade Review also projected India’s international trade to grow by US$393 billion over ten years. These are model estimates under stated assumptions, not certainties.
Scenario: regionalization replaces globalization
For several decades globalization drove economic interdependence across continents. Recent geopolitical developments point the other way. In this scenario, by 2032 regionalization has replaced globalization as the main force in world trade, and countries favour local supply chains and trade within their own region over long-distance, intercontinental trade.
Three pressures push in this direction. Geopolitical rivalry has made governments want more control over supply chains and less dependence on countries they see as potential adversaries. Regional trade agreements and local production are seen as more resilient to shocks such as pandemics and political conflicts. And new manufacturing and logistics technology makes it easier to produce closer to home. Shorter supply chains also change the compliance work for importers, because a new supplier country usually means new duty rates and origin rules; how country-specific tariff variations affect a supply chain explains why.
How regional trade flows could shift
In North America, trade within the continent strengthens under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), and the US, Canada and Mexico become more interdependent through shared infrastructure and similar regulation. The BCG estimates above support this shift directly.
The European Union deepens trade among its own members while trade with external partners, particularly the United States and China, gradually declines, partly because of greater self-reliance and partly because of friction with the major powers. (For the EU’s actual trade pattern up to 2022, see EU international trade statistics.)
Asia becomes the centre of world trade, with fast growth in trade among China, Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries. In this scenario China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strengthens those links. India, the ASEAN countries and Africa increase their share of world trade, both within their regions and with the major economies, and spread their trade across more partners so that they depend less on the US and China.
Possible geopolitical effects
Asia’s growing economic weight could turn into greater political influence and challenge the traditional dominance of Western powers, with China in particular seeking a larger say in global economic governance. The US-China trade relationship, once central to world trade, becomes less important as both countries diversify, which could leave the world trading system more fragmented.
Scenario: more trading partners for everyone
A further consequence in this scenario is that countries widen their circle of trading partners to avoid relying too much on any one country or region.
The US and China
The US-China relationship stays significant, but each side relies less on the other. The US strengthens trade with allies in Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific, while China expands its influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
India
In the author’s view, India becomes a much larger part of world trade by 2032, deepening trade within Asia and extending it to Western countries and other emerging markets, which could make it a central hub in the new trade network. Its trade agreements are the thing to watch; the US-India trade deal of 2026 is one example.
Africa
Africa’s trade with China and other emerging economies grows. Closer integration into global supply chains could improve its economic prospects and, over time, give it more political influence. The BCG figures cited above do not cover Africa, so this part of the scenario rests on the author’s judgement alone.
Risks of a fragmented world
Regionalization can bring growth and resilience, but it has costs. Fragmented trade networks could widen existing inequalities, since regions with less economic power may struggle to compete in a more localized world. Fewer ideas and technologies crossing borders could also slow innovation, which often depends on international collaboration.
The author’s suggestions for limiting those risks: revive multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN) so they can still provide a forum for dialogue, dispute resolution and fair trade rules; invest more in diplomacy to manage conflicts and build agreement on global problems; and keep international collaboration in science and technology going even as trade regionalizes. Wider trade policy trends are covered in emerging trends in global trade policy.